

Scenario: Terrorist Attack on Fuel Tank Farm

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Risk Management

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Overview of Scenario

On August 10, 2014 at approximately 2200HRS, an unidentified male caller contacted 911 indicating an explosive device will detonate at one of Carteret's fuel storage tank farms. The caller disconnected and within moments the dispatch center was inundated with calls of a fire in the vicinity of Roosevelt and Industrial Ave., in Carteret, NJ.

The first responding units advised dispatch of a fully engulfed storage tank, containing approximately 80,000 barrels of methyl cyclohexane-a highly flammable product that may cause adverse health reactions, including dizziness, as well as skin, eye, nose, and throat irritation. The fire has extended to the surrounding area, and is additionally fueled by dry brush. Weather conditions are 92 degrees, 0% humidity, with winds to the East at 15 miles per hour.

There are two reported injuries, deriving from truck drivers who were 100 feet west of the initial explosion at a refueling point. One suffered severe burns, while the other had traumatic blast injuries and is unresponsive.

Surrounding the incident are additional storage tanks (85 feet), businesses (150 feet), and residential housing (630 feet). A large shopping center and parking lot is approximately 350 feet to the west, upwind from the incident. The entrance to the New Jersey Turnpike is 1,000 feet northwest.

Incident Command Report: Edilberto Saez**Responsibility**

As Incident Commander, I am responsible for the assessment of more staff, establishing incident objectives and directing the staff to develop an action plan (FEMA).

First Priority

Upon arrival on the scene, an immediate and throughout evacuation takes place. Working with my Safety Officers, all workers and citizens are to be evacuated to locations safe and out of the way of the possible spreading fire. It is concluded that the gymnasium of Carteret High School and Middle School will work perfectly due to its large size and location away from the fire and wind current.

Setting a Command Post

Next up a location for our command post was to be selected. There are several factors to consider when determining where to place your command post. Immediate security is one of these factors; the post has to remain properly secure, considering all the important things going on within it (Ruditsky, 2006). Not having a declared area ahead of time for such a situation, it is determined that parking lot situated on Byron Street would be a perfect location seeing as how it isn't too far away, safe, has multiple ways of entrances and also gives a clear view of the disaster at hand. It is discussed with the owners of "Bus Stop Luncheonette" and the location is selected. This location provides us all with plenty of shelter and electricity of effectively work out of.

A mobile command post is later requested of the Newark Police Department with the help of our Liaison Officer, in the event that relocation becomes necessary due to the

spreading fire. Our operation officer also suggests the use of an air operation branch should it be needed.

Establishing a staging area

Staging area was also selected near these same premises towards the southern portion of said parking lot. New Jersey Tanker Task Force was located just north of it. EMS services took place just south of it. Most of these entities deploy several emergency tents, should the situation spread and relocation becomes vital.

Support and Mobilizing Additional Personnel

Seeing as how the incident is taking place at such a large scale, the need of additional resources and personnel were essential in this operation. Trained emergency responders from of Woodbridge, Iselin, Avenel, Port Reading, Perth Amboy, Linden, East Brunswick, Fords, Metuchen, Elizabeth, Edison and even Newark assist in efforts. Luckily our close relationships with these entities make it an swift and efficiently union in efforts.

Our Liaisons Officer also made several contacts with Home Depot and Walmart in order to aid all evacuates with possibly supplies that may be needed. Local restaurants and businesses aid as well by providing food for both emergency responders and citizens. Assistance was granted during all 11 hours of the fire.

Together with our Operations Officer, it is determined that the best way to deal with the situation is to establish a three sided approach to the fire. Three branches will be established. Branch 1 will be located on the southwest side on the site. Branch 2 will be located on the northeast side and branch 3 will deal with the southeast side of the initially

involved tank. It was also concluded by our Safety Officer that this strategy could also minimize potential hazards and is the most efficient.

Carteret Police Department aided in our efforts as well. Several road closures occurred at Roosevelt Ave from Post Blvd to Peter J. Sica Industrial Highway. New Jersey Turnpike Exit 12 toll plaza was shut off as well for all with the exception of emergency response vehicular activity. The police department also commenced a brief sweep of the initial disaster area in unison with the Middlesex County Bomb Squad. No other tankers revealed any sort of possible explosive device.

The Middlesex County Hazardous Materials Team was contacted and made aware of the situation due to the possibility of the tankers contents spreading. Salvation Army's Emergency Disaster Services, Woodbridge Auxilary Police also aid in efforts with both citizens and workers.

Public Support and Media

Our Public Affairs Officers kept in touch with the public during this disaster. As Incident Commander, I made sure that all information was appropriate, wanting information put out focusing on response and recovery efforts. All helping organizations and entities are noted during these reports. Public contact will occur in a far off location from the incident. Safety Officer makes note to inform on the effects of methylcyclohexane, stressing the possibility of the chemical being both breathed in and passing through skin. The public is informed that it "...irritates the eyes and the skin. High levels of the vapor may cause irritation of eyes and upper respiratory tract. Repeated or prolonged exposure can cause headaches, irritation of the eyes, nose, and

throat, and can also cause a skin rash. High exposures from skin contact or inhalation may cause damage to the heart, liver, kidneys, and lungs, and may result in death” (Toxicology Data Network).

Communications towards the Governor and Homeland Security also took place during the event. Both entities aided in staffing at the police department and fire department due to the possibility of another emergency. Safety and Operations Officers alert local hospitals of possible triage action plans. National Guard is also notified about the possibility of water pollution due to the tankards contents.

Potential transportation routes were also advised on the incident. Newark Airport and NJ Transit were both contacted and told about both the smoke plumes and potential terrorist nature of the explosion. Electric companies were also advised of potential dangers to workers and lines of electricity in the areas.

Initializing the Strategy

It is finally decided that possible removal of tankard products could possibly increase potential chemical fumes. Branch 2 and Branch 3 would douse the base of the involved tank. Exterior walls of surrounding tanks were also taken care of in an effort to prevent catastrophic wall failure, leading to an extension of fire to surrounding areas. As this happens, Branch 1 would use foam chemical spray to cut off the oxygen supply between the top levels of product. Combined actions take place effectively and efficiently in a swift manner.

The situation lasted a combined 11 hours. A total of 1,300 civilians were evacuated. 40 fire, 4 emergency medical service, and at least 7 counties, state, and federal

agencies involved in this incident. After everything is taken care of and deemed safe, streets are reopened, citizens are permitted to return to their homes and business opened as usual. Only one death is reported along with a total of 9 others injured during the blast.

Debriefing

Due to the scale and the severity of these events, debriefing and counseling take place. With everything happening at once, there is a possibility that many may feel post-traumatic effects many rise from the stress of it all. Critical Incident Stress Teams in unison with the American Red Cross and Salvation Army worked hard to debrief and counsel both workers and the public. Smaller teams were dispatch to local emergency responding agencies and both shelters established in effort to help all cope with possible emotional, social and stress related problems.

Recommendations

In unison with all officers in the incident command system, it is recommended that security around the tankards is improved. The situation wouldn't have happened if better security efforts had taken place.

It is also recommended that a clear Incident Action Plan becomes established. Having had one, the situation would have been handled much more swiftly, possibly putting a halt to all injuries and the spread of the fire.

Overall, response worked efficiently and hard to handle the situation. Joint efforts between all entities worked well together and structurally, our mutual aids and incident

command structure cooperatively stopped the situation from spreading to a larger disaster.

Operations Report: Rob Rivera

Upon arrival, Command is initially established in the parking lot of the Carteret Shopping Center strip mall located approximately 350' West of the incident, until such time that communication was established with the owners of "Bus Stop Luncheonette", also located in the strip mall, providing an indoor location with electricity, shelter, and climate control, making it an ideal location for Incident Command Operations Center.

Immediately, it is decided to create three branches to attack the fire. This includes branch 1, located on the southwest side, branch 2, located on the northeast side, and branch 3, located on the southeast side of the involved tank. An air operations branch is also considered ("Organizational Assignment List", 2014). Finally, a mobile command post was requested of from the Newark Police Department in the event of relocation of the command post. It staged at the intersection of Peter J. Sica Industrial Highway and Industrial Avenue.

The first initial causality was John Doe #1, who was unresponsive following blast injuries. He was transported via basic life support ambulance to University Hospital in Newark, the nearest level one trauma facility, but was later pronounced deceased. The second, was Chris P. Bacon, 42, from Coffin Top, Georgia. He suffered severe burns, with EMS requesting a medevac to St. Barnabas Hospital. A landing zone was established by Carteret Fire Department at the Carteret High School's track & field. New

Jersey State Police's "NorthSTAR" medevac arrived, and patient care was transferred ("New Jersey Department of Health...", 2014).

Road closures occurred at Roosevelt Ave from Post Blvd to Peter J. Sica Industrial Highway and the New Jersey Turnpike Exit 12 toll plaza, with the exception of emergency response vehicular activity. Due to the nature of the attack, it was required that all units entering or exiting the restricted area were required to display appropriate agency identification cards, as mandated by law ("Homeland Security", 2014). Local law enforcement was tasked with this effort.

A brief sweep of the surrounding tankers was completed by the Carteret Police Department revealed no secondary explosive devices. The Middlesex County Bomb Squad was advised, and responded for additional searches of the surrounding area, revealing nothing.

Staging for fire apparatus was the southernmost portion of the parking lot, while the New Jersey Tanker Task Force established operations on the northernmost portion of parking lot, alongside Roosevelt Ave. EMS Command was established in the southwest corner of the parking lot, with accessibility to Lexington Ave. Utilization of the FDNY Marine One "343"'s Neptune pumping system for additional water supply was ruled out due to distance between incident and the Arthur Kill River.

The Incident Commander deemed an evacuation of civilians necessary after discussions with the Safety Officer. The Middlesex County Hazardous Materials Team was contacted and made aware of the situation. They indicated a response time of less than 20 minutes.

The Woodbridge Township Auxiliary Police were tasked with the evacuation of all residential areas north of Roosevelt Ave., with shelters being established at the gymnasiums of Carteret High School and Carteret Middle School. The Red Cross was contacted to set up lodging support at that location, while the Salvation Army's Emergency Disaster Services were requested to the EMS staging area to provide support for the first responders, as well as to the high school for possible long-term food and emotional support for the relocated citizens.

At this time, numerous mutual aid agencies had already been summoned, and were arriving to the fire staging area. These municipalities included Woodbridge, Iselin, Avenel, Port Reading, Perth Amboy, Linden, East Brunswick, Fords, Metuchen, Elizabeth, and Edison. Additionally, the New Jersey Tanker Task Force was mobilized. Some of these units were assigned to step-up operations at the Carteret Fire House to respond to any other calls within the borough while Carteret's apparatus was already committed to this incident.

Secondary considerations and communications were directed towards the Office of the Governor of the State of New Jersey, United States Department of Homeland Security, increasing the staffing at the Borough of Carteret's police dispatch center to handle the increase in call volume, alerting area hospitals of possible triage action plans (TAPs) taking effect, and the National Guard in the event of civil disobedience and/or facilitation

of water purification efforts. Also, the regional water pumping stations were advised of the incident in an effort to maintain optimum pressurization of the suppression lines, particularly due to the already high demand for water due to the extreme weather conditions already present.

Tertiary considerations were also addressed, relating to transportation routes adversely affected by this incident. This included notification to Newark Liberty International Airport, as smoke plumes were directly in the flight path of passenger airliners. Railway agencies Conrail and New Jersey Transit (NJT) were also contacted, as their tracks and pathways are in close proximity to this incident. Lastly, communication with Public Service Electric and Gas (PSE&G) was established to address any potential underground gas lines and/or electrical considerations relating to the fire. PSE&G dispatched teams to the fire staging area within 30 minutes of first contact.

It was quickly concluded that removal of product from the surrounding tanks would increase the potential for the remaining fumes inside any emptied tanks to ignite violently (“Barton Solvents Case Study”, 2014). The suppressive method decided was a dual-pronged attack. First, Branch 2 and Branch 3 would douse the base of the involved tank, as well as the exterior walls of surrounding tanks to prevent catastrophic wall failure, leading to an extension of fire to surrounding areas. Second, Branch 1 would use foam chemical spray to cut off the oxygen supply between the top level of product and the ambient air. This delegation and tactic faired particularly well, given the 15-mile per hour

easterly winds. Firefighters were rotated every 15 minutes due to the extreme heat conditions.

The fire lasted approximately 11 hours, and was declared under control at 0900HRS. It resulted in the evacuation of approximately 1,300 civilians, with two shelters accommodating nearly 500 people at each. There were approximately 40 fire, 4 emergency medical service, and at least 7 county, state, and federal agencies involved in this incident. Following the termination of command, streets were reopened for traffic, residents were permitted to return to their homes, emergency units cleared the scene, and business resumed. There was one death, one serious injury, and eight heat-related injuries.

Following the incident, Critical Incident Stress Debriefing Teams, in conjunction with the American Red Cross and Salvation Army, worked to address to social, emotional, psychological, and spiritual needs of the first responders and citizens who were affected by this incident. Small teams were sent to responding agency headquarters, while larger setups were established at the two resident shelters.

Security in and around the tank farm was weak at best. A comprehensive Incident Action Plan (IAC) was not in place prior to this incident, causing a delay in the decision-making processes during this event. Overall, the response was adequate in both quantity & quality. Pre-established mutual aid agreements were implemented effectively, the incident command structure operated cooperatively, and most importantly, no citizens

from the surrounding community were physically injured. The deceased John Doe #1 was ultimately the primary suspect in the initial incendiary device causing this incident to transpire.

Finance/Administration Report: Jesse Lynch

As Finance and Administration Section Chief, I am responsible for multiple tasks in the immediate aftermath of the explosion. FEMA states that my job is to “organize and operate the Finance/Administration Section within the guidelines, policy, and constraints established by the Incident Commander and the responsible agency. These duties include, recording all personnel time, procuring additional resources, recording every expense, documenting injuries and liability issues and lastly, administering critical incident stress management afterwards” (Roles and Responsibilities in a Terrorist Incident, 2002). To make sure this is all done successfully in a timely matter, I have set up three units to make sure all jobs are completed. Those three units are: the procurement unit, the time unit, and the cost/compensation claims unit. Each will have multiple responsibilities that will be extremely important to the emergency management process.

A command center was initially set up in the parking lot of the Carteret Shopping Center, until an indoor location was established. The official Incident Command Operations Center is to be held inside the building of the “Bus Stop Luncheonette.” Compensation will need to be disbursed to the owners of the restaurant following the emergency, a job for the cost/compensation claims unit. The procurement unit’s first request was to the Newark Police Department. A mobile command unit was requested in the case that the team had to move from their location inside the luncheonette.

Procuring Additional Resources

Procuring additional resources will be assigned to the procurement unit. This task holds great importance because the Borough of Carteret does not have nearly enough personnel to deal with this emergency. Two of the more notable additional resources that were of the utmost priority were calling in the Middlesex County Bomb Squad, as well as additional fire departments to combat the fire. The bomb squad's job was to make sure a secondary explosion was not imminent. After combing the surrounding area, they revealed that there was no other threat. Reinforcement fire departments were immediately called upon by the procurement unit. The bordering municipalities that were alerted were: Port Reading, Woodbridge, Avenel, Iselin, Perth Amboy, Linden, East Brunswick, Fords, Metuchen, Elizabeth, and Edison. Their help was not limited to just fighting the fire, they also helped provide support to the Carteret Fire Department in responding to other calls throughout the municipality.

The Carteret Police Department was also quickly overwhelmed. Additional forces from neighboring Woodbridge Police Department and Edison Police Department were suggested. When the Incident Commander called for an evacuation, those police departments assisted in doing so. They also assisted in the many traffic issues that were caused by the blast. Several road closures were established. Roosevelt Avenue, a busy street in Carteret needed to be closed from Post Boulevard to Peter J. Sica Industrial Highway, as well as the New Jersey Turnpike Exit 12 toll plaza.

The procurement unit were also tasked with the job of alerting Carteret High School and Carteret Middle School, so that their gymnasiums could be used as shelter for those displaced from their homes. Lastly, the unit also requested the services of the Red Cross to help with set up of the shelters, and the Salvation Army to assist the first responders and relocated citizens in regards to emotional support.

Recording Personnel Time

In the chaos following an emergency it is still necessary to record all personnel on the scene. This is imperative because in the madness, a security threat can easily slip through the cracks. Also, in the aftermath of the situation it is important to know who was there for the purpose of records and reports. It might seem like something of minimal significance, but when analyzing how successful the response was, this information is needed. The time unit is faced with this responsibility. An immediate priority of the time unit was to establish a form of an identification system. It was stressed to this unit that nobody should be allowed on the premises until identification has been presented. The job of this was assigned to the Carteret Police Department, and they were assisted by the Woodbridge Police Department and Edison Police Department when they arrived.

This will not be an easy job. Policies of every specific agency need to be considered. Logs need to be kept and double-checked to make sure of their accuracy. Also, some personnel must be stationed at the schools that are being used for shelters. It will be important to make sure only the people that are supposed to be there enter the building. Additional personnel will be advised to search the area and film witnesses in hopes that

the suspect could be identified. One of the two victims who suffered injuries is being considered as a suspect, but the steps of searching and filming the witnesses is still necessary in case that is not the suspect or there are accomplices. The time unit will also be responsible for logging the time on the scene spent by the other chiefs: the Planning Section Chief, the Operation Section Chief, and the Logistics Section Chief, as well as the Incident Commander. Anyone leaving the scene should also check out with the officers in charge of checking identification. There will need to be someone on duty, in several locations at all hours to avoid confusion.

Recording Expenses

Such a powerful explosion will always create damage. One of the cost/compensation claims unit's main job will be to provide cost analysis data. Luckily, they will not have to deal with that task of having to pay the additional personnel due to the fact that they are all municipal agencies. The cost/compensation claims unit will have to work closely with the time unit so when other agencies request the data of who worked when, it will be readily available. Other tanks in the tank farm were definitely damaged. It will be up to the cost/compensation claims unit record all damages when it is safe to do so. It does not seem that the fire will damage any of the residential homes in the area, but a preliminary survey should be conducted by the cost/compensation claims unit to ask every home owner if they noticed any damage to their home from anything that might have struck it as a result of the blast.

An important role of the cost/compensation claims unit will be deciding the proper amount of compensation that should be given to the Bus Stop Luncheonette. As Finance Section Chief, I would suggest paying them for what there approximate expected earnings would be for the time that they were closed because of us, and adding 10% as a thank you. Also, anything that the Red Cross did not cover in regards to the shelters needs to be handled by the cost/compensation claims unit. Food and beverages were able to be purchased at the Shop Rite in Carteret, which coincidentally was right near the blast, at 801 Roosevelt Avenue. Additional sleeping bags, blankets, pillows, fans and air conditioners were purchased from the Wal Mart in Hopelawn at 360 US Highway 9 N.

The most important job of the cost/compensation claims unit will be to decide what compensation the two victims should receive. If either victim does not survive, the compensation will be redirected to their family. Of course, if the one victim who is being looked at as a suspect, whose injuries are more severe, turns out to be the bomber, no compensation will be awarded. Close work with the medical team will be necessary to determine the extent of the injuries. Then, the cost/compensation claims unit will have to analyze similar cases to see what a proper amount to offer the other victim is.

Considering the fact that security at the tank farm was weak, it is a possibility that legal actions might be taken. A generous compensation offer might save us from a lengthy court room battle. Lastly, the cost/compensation claims unit must work closely with the planning section chief. For each and everything that is being planned, the unit must come up with an estimate of how much that is going to cost.

Conclusion

In conclusion, each of the three units are responsible for a wide variety of jobs. Without the hard work of each team, being successful in the response to this emergency will be impossible. The units will report to me and I will report back to the Incident Commander (Characteristics of the Incident Command System: Finance/Administration Section Chief). We were lucky enough that the blast did not take more lives, but we are not in the clear yet. The procuring of additional resources was a key part to overcoming this event. Added security to the tank farm will definitely be suggested to prevent anything like this from occurring again.

Logistics Report: Stephanie Israel

Definition- "Logistics is defined as a business planning framework for the management of material, service, information and capital flows. It includes the increasingly complex information, communication and control systems required in today's business environment."

As the Logistics Officer I will be the key source in the needed resources to help finance, planning and operations within a crisis. As a logistics officer I will plan, deliver and locate items that may be needed to help the employees, civilians, first response staff, and law enforcement officials. Additionally, I will assist with handling the resources, services and supplies that are required in this crisis so that everything can flow smoothly and so that the incident may be managed accordingly. Specifically some areas I will manage are equipment, communication, transportation, food and supplies, restroom and shower facilities, and personnel.

Communications

Adequate communication equipment will be acquired to support all resources and to ensure the rapid flow of information to and from operation units, planning units, command units, families, law enforcement officers, and management units.

Communication supplies are an adequate source of communication so that all resources can have a concise and clear understanding of the situation and everyone involved. The following equipment should be included to the essential needs list for proper information flow within the tank explosion incident. These items should be available to appropriate departments within 24hrs at the very latest.

- Radio Communication- Two way radios
- GPS Tracking
- Regular telephone (POT LINES)
- Cell Phones
- Computers
- Printers
- Email
- Broadband Connection
- Emergency Phone number list containing the numbers of all responders

General Supplies

In order to support the administrative and operations departments we need to supply basic writing utensils and stationery which is suitable necessity for this situation and any high-risk incident of this nature. I recommend that the following items should be included as

the essential needs list for proper information flow throughout departments. These items should also be available to appropriate departments within 24hrs.

- Electrical Supplies- Flashlights, Radios, Televisions, Battery, Outlets, Charges for Wireless and handheld devices
- General Stationery (Pen, Pencils, Paper)
- Office Equipment (Copier, Staplers, Paper Shredder)

There is a large P.C. Richard Electronic store not far from the Carteret High School where we will be housing the evacuated civilians. We will request loaners from their store and or any donations they can make to help us with electronics for the time being.

Food and Water

We will need to supply food and water to the 1300 civilians that were evacuated. The two shelters we will have open at the Carteret High School and Carteret Middle School will have the Salvation Army with a portable soup kitchen and their “Emergency Disaster services.” These services assist families and needy individuals with emergency food housing and utility assistance. Additionally we can count on the local Shoprite supermarket to donate food and water along with three local restaurants on the west side of town. These restaurants compose of Italian and Chinese cuisine and they are willing to help us out by donating all pre-made food that was not consumed throughout the day. I also reached out to the manager at the Panera restaurant in Woodbridge, N.J. they usually have a program where they donate their food at the end of the night to a local soup kitchen, I discussed the incident with the manager and he agreed to have that food brought directly to our centers of accommodation.

Accommodations

Besides the Carteret High School and Carteret Middle School we also have the Holiday Inn that is willing to assist us with lodging at no cost. The Red Cross is setting up their lodging support throughout these three locations and we will be splitting the civilians five hundred each way between the schools and the remainder at the local hotel. We will also be providing support to the first responders, the company personnel, and firefighters should they need it. The accommodations will be readily available within one hour of the incident.

Transportation


Sufficient transportation vehicles/vessels should be acquired to support all assets mobility and response to the incident. Transportation will be acquired from company vehicles, state and federal agencies and rental services. The following equipment should be included but not limited to for proper transportation flow throughout the incident. This should be available to departments within 24hrs.

- Rent road vehicles from Gem Limousine, Woodbridge N.J. (800) 223-1161
- Vans- Transport security and personnel
- Company cars that are used throughout tank farms

Personnel

Personnel will be supplied from various organizations and companies to help in the training and support aspect. Also to help with the handling of equipment that logistics supplies. All personnel will be tasked by operations and incident command. The following equipment should be available to appropriate departments within 24 hours.

- Taxi/Limo Drivers for all evacuated families, personnel that was working at the time of the incident and any other support staff that may need transportation.
- Supply trained emergency responders from different communities
- Supply Liaison Officer, Public Affairs Officer and Safety Officer
- Middlesex County Hazardous Material Team should be on call in the event of more spreading.



Planning Report: Ramandeep Kaur

For the purposes of this plan, evacuation is defined as: *“the movement of persons from a dangerous place due to the threat or occurrence of a disaster or emergency incident.”*

Upon learning of the explosion the Incident commander was notified of the situation. The storage tank contained methylcyclohexane, which is harmful if inhaled or swallowed. Vapor or mist is irritating to the eyes, mucous membrane and upper respiratory tract and skin. Immediately after the explosion, fire started to spread to surrounding areas and towns.

The Federal Bureau of Investigations (F.B.I) was notified of the threat and was briefed about the unidentified male caller who contacted 911 indicating that an explosive device will detonate at one of Carteret's tank farms.

The F.B.I discovered the following during their investigation:

1. Tank farm was a viable target
2. Target only 15 miles from N.Y.C
3. It would do economical damage
4. Main target human life, health and safety

As part of the planning team my highest priority will be the safety of the personnel's in the facility. The evacuation alarm will be activated. The evacuation procedures are to be followed thoroughly. Immediately after the evacuation we will make sure all the personnel's are accounted for. We will follow up with the Incident

Commander to make sure that the surrounding areas are evacuated immediately. We will inform the surrounding towns of the attack and have them on high alert. The vicinity will be immediately secured and safety perimeters will be established.

The facilities develop plan for rapid deployment will go into effect immediately. Rahway and Perth Amboy Hospital will provide medical supplies. As evacuees arrive in cars, staff or volunteers should quickly assess evacuees and collect information on certain symptoms so that individuals can be directed to quarantine sites, acute care facilities, etc.

Health personnel will likely need to triage patients, screening and decontaminating individuals, and treating and stabilizing those with significant medical needs. People with respiratory problems, in particular, severe respiratory distress might require short- and long-term treatments. Food and water are always the most essential “medical supplies” (Gold, 2012). When children need medical attention, keep parents with them to perform tasks such as bathing, comforting, etc. Triage at an alternate care site in order to ensure that the “worried well” do not block those who need care.

We want to make sure that there is communication between the incident commander, all emergency and first aid responders. The communications unit leader will be responsible for setting up communications and issuing radios during a discharge event. Communications with the local police departments will be initiated and maintained by telephone. The radio systems will consist of permanent base station and repeater facilities that provide coverage to radios in shelters and emergency vehicles and hand-held radios in the facility area (Howe, 2004).

The radios will ensure that a consistent, clear message is transmitted to citizens and evacuees across towns. We will communicate with appropriate government

authorities, including public health, legal, law enforcement, etc. to report events and execute the directed response as part of a coordinated preparedness and response plans.

The Planning Team will:

- Coordinate to the opening of one or more shelters as necessary.
- Coordinate support to the on-scene evacuation operations through city departments and agencies.
- Coordinate the opening and operating of an assembly area as needed.
- Coordinate requests for resources from sources outside the City.
- Coordinate the development and dissemination of emergency information to the residents of the city.
- Monitor the media to determine the need to clarify evacuation/protective action issues and provide updated information to the public.
- Develop and implement a public information strategy to ensure that the public receives timely, accurate and consistent information related to the evacuation.
- Schedule and conduct press briefings, interviews and press releases as appropriate.
- Monitor rumors and take action to correct or control them.
- Utilize all available communication tools including public information releases, the cable television emergency message system, the electronic alert messaging system (eMAS), the radio, television, and media releases to provide information to the public on protective actions and evacuations (Emergency Management, n.d).

The scenario emphasizes the need for incident preparedness to proceed through a capabilities-based approach. Examinations of the scenario lead to certain common functions that must be accomplished. There was a need for response organizations to



move quickly and in coordinated manner. One of the major issues was the delay in treating the mass casualties (OSHA/EPA, n.d).

The following policies and procedures were put into place following the incident:

1. The emergency assessment and diagnosis team was created so that they can detect an incident, determine its impact, classify the incident and make notifications
2. The emergency management and response team joined together with intelligence and planning so they have the ability to direct, control, and coordinate a response. They should be able to provide emergency public information to the population at risk and the public at large.
3. There will be a victim care unit on site so that the unit has the ability to treat civilians or other personnels at a medical treatment facility, and provide tracking and security of patients possessions and evidence.

The above policies were put into place because of poor communications with the 911 call center, delayed the community shelter-in-place notification and interfered with effective off-site response activities.

Appendix A



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